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vABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis is to determine if the Commander’s Emergency 
Response Program (CERP) achieved its intended goals in Herat Province, Afghanistan. 
The thesis uses a qualitative approach, gathering information and observations from 
CERP projects completed in Herat Province, Afghanistan. Satellite images of projects 
initiated in 2008 and 2009 were investigated to determine if they have produced long 
term, positive effects for the people of Herat province. Utilizing a list of 52 projects, it 
was determined that 54% of the projects had been successful while 6% were judged to be 
failures; the results of 40% of the projects are unknown. The program was effective 
at achieving its short-term goals; however, the long-term results will not be known until 
the Afghan government becomes self-sustaining. In future conflicts utilizing 
CERP-like systems, it is recommended that commanders and managers receive 
more thorough training prior to administering the program. 
 vi
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS  
I.  INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................1 
A.  MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION..........................................................1 
B.  SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION ...........................1 
C.  PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES .........................................................1 
D.  LITERATURE REVIEW .........................................................................2 
E.  METHODS AND SOURCES ....................................................................7 
F.  THESIS OVERVIEW ...............................................................................7 
II.  ORIGINS AND GUIDANCE FOR THE COMMANDER’S 
EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROGRAM ...........................................................9 
A.  THE CREATION OF THE COMMANDER’S EMERGENCY 
RESPONSE PROGRAM ..........................................................................9 
B.  LEGISLATURE CREATING AND SUSTAINING THE CERP .......10 
C.  CERP DOCTRINE ..................................................................................14 
III.  HOW PROJECTS WERE SELECTED AND MONITORED: THE 
HERAT CASE STUDY .......................................................................................19 
A.  PROJECT SELECTION IN HERAT, AFGHANISTAN ....................19 
B.  PROJECT MONITORING: CHALLENGES FOR 
MANAGEMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY......................................21 
IV.  DID PROJECTS ACHIEVE THEIR INTENDED GOAL? ............................23 
A.  RECALLING THE INTENDED GOAL ...............................................23 
B.  HAVE PROJECTS “WORKED”? CONFLICTING 
STANDARDS PRODUCE MIXED MESSAGES .................................24 
C.  FAILED PROJECT—SHINDAND AGRICULTURE 
RESEARCH STATION ..........................................................................28 
D.  FAILED PROJECT—KHAIRABAD SCHOOL REPAIRS ...............30 
E.  SUCCESSFUL PROJECT–HERAT TEACHER TRAINING 
CENTER ...................................................................................................33 
F.  SUCCESSFUL PROJECT–ZENDA JAN NESWAN SCHOOL ........35 
V.  CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................39 
LIST OF REFERENCES ................................................................................................41 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ...................................................................................43 
 viii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 ix
LIST OF FIGURES  
Figure 1.  General Project Approval and Management Process .................................17 
Figure 2.  Herat province CERP Projects, September 2009. ......................................27 
Figure 3.  Shindand Agriculture Research Station, August 29, 2008. .......................29 
Figure 4.  Shindand Agriculture Research Station, October 1, 2016. ........................29 
Figure 5.  Faisal Ahmad with the Author in front of the Khairabad School, 
January 2009. .............................................................................................31 
Figure 6.  Khairabad School, September 29, 2013. ....................................................32 
Figure 7.  Khairabad School, October 1, 2016. ..........................................................33 
Figure 8.  Herat Teacher Training Center, August 29, 2008. .....................................34 
Figure 9.  Herat Teacher Training Center, September 29, 2016. ...............................35 
Figure 10.  Zenda Jan School Site, April 6, 2009. .......................................................36 
Figure 11.  Zenda Jan School, September 23, 2016. ....................................................37 
 
 x
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  
 xi
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
AOR Area of Responsibility 
ARSIC-W Afghan Regional Security Integration Command–West 
CALL Center for Army Lessons Learned 
CENTCOM U.S. Central Command 
CERP Commander’s Emergency Response Program 
CRRT CERP Reviewing/Reporting Database 
DoD Department of Defense 
FY fiscal year 
ISAF International Security Assistance Forces 
JP 3-07 Joint Publication 3–07 Stability 
JPEL Joint Prioritized Effects List 
MAAWS Money as a Weapon System 
MoA Afghan Ministry of Agriculture 
NDAA National Defense Authorization Act 
MGRS military grid reference system 
O & M operations and maintenance 
SECDEF Secretary of Defense 
SIGAR Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction  
TTC Teacher Training Center 
TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures 
USAID United States Agency for International Development 
 xii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xiii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I would like to thank Professors James Russell and Zachary Davis for their 
guidance throughout the thesis process. I would also like to thank my wife and our two 
children for their unwavering support throughout the last 15 months.  
 
 xiv
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 1
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The purpose of this thesis is to determine if the Commander’s Emergency 
Response Program achieved its intended goals in Herat Province, Afghanistan.  
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
The significance of the research question is to gain a better understanding of 
stability operations executed by United States ground forces. U.S. Army doctrine states 
that, “stability tasks are part of every operation.”1 As part of stability operations, the 
Commander’s Emergency Response Program was created. Established in 2003, CERP 
funds were allocated with legislation that specified that commanders could spend the 
funds for urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction projects.2 These projects had to 
immediately assist the Iraqi and Afghan peoples within a commander’s operational area.3 
Since 2003, the United States Congress has appropriated over $3.7 billion for CERP in 
Afghanistan.4 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
The major problem addressed by this thesis is determining if the Commander’s 
Emergency Response Program has achieved its goal of responding to urgent civil support 
relief and reconstruction requirements within an Area of Responsibility (AOR) and 
whether the program assisted the indigenous population. There are two hypotheses that 
can be formulated in the examination of CERP’s success. The first hypothesis is that the 
people of the Herat Province have benefitted from the Commander’s Emergency 
                                                 
1 U.S. Army, “Field Manual 3–07, Stability Operations” (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department 
of the Army, 2014), 1–1. 
2 Director for Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5), “Joint Publication 3–07: Stability Operations,” Joint 
Staff, Washington, DC (September 29, 2011), E-10. 
3 Ibid., E-10. 
4 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, SIGAR Inspection Report 16–22: 
Department of Defense Reconstruction Projects: Summary of SIGAR Inspection Reports Issued from July 
2009 through September 2015 (Washington, DC: SIGAR, March, 2016), 2. 
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Response Program. The people of Herat are better off now than before the program 
began. The second hypothesis predicts that the people of Herat are not better off than 
before and that CERP has been an unjustified expense for the U.S. government. If the 
first hypothesis is correct, despite its cost, the effects of the program are hugely beneficial 
to the Afghan population as well as to the standing of the U.S. government in the eye of 
that population. If the second hypothesis is correct, CERP and programs like it need to be 
reevaluated before the U.S. becomes involved in future stability operations. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This thesis evaluates the U.S. military’s approach to stability operations. The 
thesis develops hypotheses that helps determines the effectiveness of an aspect of 
stability operations: The Commander’s Emergency Response Program. The outcome of 
this research will theorize how U.S. ground forces better conduct future stability 
operations. In addition to analyzing CERP projects completed in Herat Province, this 
thesis will evaluate Department of Defense policies to formulate how the U.S. military’s 
stability operations can better support host nation populations. 
In early 2003, U.S. ground forces patrolling in Iraq found more than $1.2 billion 
in U.S. currency stashed by fleeing Iraqi government officials.5 The U.S. Central 
Command quickly seized the money and understood that the money was the possession 
of the Iraqi people. They acted quickly to return the money in the form of projects built 
by Iraqis, maintained by Iraqis, and intended to benefit the people of Iraq. By the fall of 
2003, the money had been depleted but the positive effect it was having on the population 
was apparent.6 In November 2003, Congress passed House Resolution 3289 which 
allocated $180 million in operation and maintenance funds to be used for “urgent Iraqi 
humanitarian and reconstruction relief and assistance for the people of Afghanistan.”7 
                                                 
5 Center for Army Lessons Learned, Commander’s Emergency Response Program: Tactics, 
Techniques, and Procedures. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combined Arms Center (2008), 1. 
6 Ibid., 1. 
7 H.R.3289—Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of 
Iraq and Afghanistan, 2004 (Section 1110), Library of Congress, last accessed September 16, 2016, 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/108th-congress/house-bill/3289/text?resultIndex=3.  
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President George W. Bush signed the bill in to law and began the flow of taxpayer money 
to be allocated to the Commander’s Emergency Response Program. “Today, the purpose 
of the CERP remains unchanged—to provide commanders a capability to effectively 
respond to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements within their areas 
of responsibility by carrying out programs that will immediately assist the indigenous 
population.”8 To this day, as CERP begins to wind down in Afghanistan, the purpose of 
the program has remained the same.  
The introduction of the CERP concept preceded, by nearly five years, the 
publication of the U.S. Army’s first field manual specifically focused on stability 
operations.9 The same precedence can be said for the Center for Army Lessons Learned 
handbook on CERP.10 About the same time the author had arrived in Afghanistan, 
commanders in the field should have been receiving their first copies of both documents. 
In September 2008, the Commander of Afghan Regional Security Integration Command–
West (ARSIC-W) received a 34-year-old Navy lieutenant to become his CERP manager. 
With no experience in civil affairs, engineering, or stability operations, the assignment 
of a Navy helicopter pilot to conduct humanitarian relief and reconstruction projects 
was perhaps an indication that CERP doctrine was still being digested by senior 
military leaders. 
The Commander’s Emergency Response Program was designed to assist 
commanders in a number of ways but there were restrictions. CERP projects had to fit in 
to one of nineteen different categories:11 
                                                 
8 Under Secretary of Defense, Comptroller, Memorandum: Commanders’ Emergency Response 
Program (CERP) Guidance. Washington, DC:  Under Secretary of Defense, Comptroller, May 9, 2007, 1. 
9 U.S. Army, Field Manual 3–07, Stability Operations (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of 
the Army, 2008). 
10 Center for Army Lessons Learned, Commander’s Emergency Response Program.  
11 Comptroller, Memorandum, 1–2. 
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1. Water and sanitation 







8. Economic, financial, and 
management improvements 
9. Transportation 
10.  Rule of law and governance  
11.  Irrigation 
12.  Civic cleanup activities 
13.  Civic support vehicles 
14.  Repair of civic and cultural 
facilities 
15.  Repair of property damaged 
by coalition military 
operations 
16.  Condolence payments for 
next of kin of police or 
defense personnel killed in 
coalition military operations 
17.  Payment to personnel upon 
release from detention 
18.  Protective measure for 
critical infrastructure 
19.  Other urgent humanitarian or 
reconstruction projects 
In 2007, project costs were capped at $500,000 per contract but projects could 
exceed that amount as long as the project was approved at the U.S. Central Command 
level.12 Projects were identified and nominated by commanders or their staff, local 
authorities, U.S. government agencies, or Provincial Reconstruction Teams. Ideally, 
projects would be recommended by local government authorities that would be 
responsible for maintaining the project after completion.13 Ultimately, however, every 
project was to be signed-off by the AOR commander regardless of nominating individual. 
The locations and scope of the projects were vast as evidenced by the 9657 projects 
reported throughout Afghanistan from 2004 to 2014.14 Projects were selected from each 
                                                 
12 Comptroller, Memorandum, 1–2. 
13 Army Lessons Learned, Commander’s Emergency Response Program, 16. 
14 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, SIGAR Special Project 15–49: 
Department of Defense Commander’s Emergency Response Program: Priorities and Spending in 
Afghanistan for Fiscal Years 2004–2014 (Washington, DC: SIGAR, April, 2015), 8. 
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of the 19 categories and completed in all 34 provinces of Afghanistan, with a large 
portion of the projects taking place in volatile Kandahar and Helmand Provinces.15  
Problems with the approval of certain CERP projects were experienced because 
of a rule that was attached to the program by the Undersecretary of Defense: 
“Appropriated funds made available for the CERP shall not be used for direct or indirect 
benefit to U.S., coalition, or supporting military personnel.”16 It is difficult to assume that 
a commander would spend money in his AOR, on Afghan projects, without having some 
thought that it would benefit his forces either by ensuring security or gaining cooperation 
from the population. This assumption is compounded by the advent of Money as a 
Weapon System (MAAWS) and its relationship to CERP. The MAAWS Standard 
Operating Procedure for CERP states that the program, “helps the coalition alleviate 
human suffering without conditions or impartiality and create a positive impression of 
coalition forces and the (Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan).”17 This 
statement appears to be an effort at shaping the battlefield in Afghanistan with CERP 
funds and partaking in stability operations helping U.S. forces. This thesis will not 
speculate on the benefit of the CERP on U.S. forces but rather the humanitarian benefit to 
Afghanistan.  
Criticism of the Commander’s Emergency Response Program usually revolves 
around the poor accounting that has taken place in Afghanistan and the unknown nature 
of the majority of the projects completed.18 Additional criticism is often focused on 
projects that were completed but are unsustainable.19 Commanders occasionally 
approved of projects that had unintended consequences. For example, before the spring 
                                                 
15 Special Inspector General, SIGAR Special Project 15–49, 3. 
16 Comptroller, Memorandum, 2. 
17 U.S. Forces, Afghanistan, “USFOR-A Publication 1–06: Money as a Weapon System, 
Commander’s Emergency Response Program SOP,” http://info.publicintelligence.net/USFOR-A-
MAAWS-2012.pdf, 5. 
18 Special Inspector General, SIGAR Special Project 15–49, 8. 
19 Kevin Sieff, “In Afghanistan, clinic funded by U.S. military closes because of lack of government 




planting season of 2009, the author used CERP funds to purchase over 370 tons of wheat 
seed and 166,000 fruit trees.20 The intent was to decrease Herat Province’s dependence 
on poppy growth. A donation of this size would give farmers a head start and put 
valuable money in their pockets. At the time, wheat seed was becoming cost prohibitive 
and criminal elements were pushing poppy seeds on farmers. The unintended 
consequence of the CERP purchase was that we drove up the price of wheat seed and 
fruit saplings across western Afghanistan and eastern Iran. The Commander of ARSIC-W 
had purchased nearly every wheat seed and fruit tree in the region. Those farmers 
unfortunate enough not to be on the receiving end of our donation were left unable to 
afford seeds for that growing season. Poppy fields continued to be grown in the province.  
Much criticism of the CERP does not explain if the program was successful or 
not. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) reports have 
undoubtedly shown that CERP has provided jobs, infrastructure, and income to a country 
that did not previously have them. Afghanistan is an evolving and complex country that 
is still undergoing transformation. Determining if CERP achieved its goal of “providing 
commanders a capability to effectively respond to urgent humanitarian relief and 
reconstruction requirements” is a difficult task.21 As Dr. Michael Fischerkeller wrote in 
Prism, “There are as many perspectives on the desired effect of CERP employment as 
there are conclusions regarding CERP effectiveness.”22 Perhaps the answer to the 
question of whether CERP has worked or not is yet to be determined.  
Further examination is needed to determine if the CERP program has been 
successful in Herat Province, Afghanistan. Has the Commander’s Emergency Response 
Program helped the people of Afghanistan or has it been nothing more than a waste of 
money for the United States government? 
                                                 
20 ISAF Public Affairs Office, “ARSIC-W donates wheat seed to reduce poppy growth in Herat,” 
International Security Assistance Force, last accessed September 17, 2016, 
http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/pressreleases/2009/02/pr090222-171.html. 
21 Center for Army Lessons Learned, Commander’s Emergency Response Program, 1. 
22 Michael Fischerkeller, “The Premature Debate on CERP Effectiveness,” Prism 2, No. 4 (August, 
2011): 142–143. 
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E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis uses a qualitative approach, gathering information and observations 
from projects completed in Herat Province, Afghanistan. Observations of projects will be 
investigated to determine if they have produced long term, positive effects for the people 
of Herat province. The author possess imagery from CERP projects from his tour in 
Afghanistan, a small sample of those projects will be investigated to see if they have 
endured or produced as they had intended. Additionally, material critical of the CERP 
campaign will be examined to determine if the program has been valuable from a cost-
benefit standpoint. As U.S. forces continue to operate in Afghanistan, it’s difficult to 
forecast what will happen after they leave. Perhaps only then can we truly understand the 
effects CERP had on the population. Unable to adequately forecast, this thesis will 
examine completed projects and determine if they are still operational or performing as 
intended; successes will be annotated if they are still functioning properly and assisting 
the Afghan population. 
This thesis will use a variety of sources including scholarly journals, policy 
papers, U.S. government documents including Center for Army Lessons Learned reports, 
and reports from the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. This 
thesis will use U.S. military doctrinal publications to more fully understand the U.S. 
military and government’s role and approach to stability operations and CERP. 
Additionally, this thesis will review U.S. and Afghan news sources to determine the 
current level of stability in western Afghanistan as well as various images to determine 
the current material condition of CERP projects managed by the author in 2008 and 2009. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis is divided into five chapters. Following the introductory chapter, 
Chapter II explains the legislature and doctrine that helped establish the Commander’s 
Emergency Response Program. Chapter III is an analysis of the process by which projects 
were selected and monitored in Herat, Afghanistan. Chapter IV is an analysis of whether 
the projects succeeded in achieving their intended purpose. Chapter V is the conclusion 
and outlines implications for future stability operations. 
 8
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II. ORIGINS AND GUIDANCE FOR THE COMMANDER’S 
EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROGRAM 
A. THE CREATION OF THE COMMANDER’S EMERGENCY RESPONSE 
PROGRAM 
In order to better understand the successes or failures of the Commander’s 
Emergency Response Program you need to take a look at how the program came to 
existence, how it continued to be funded, and how it was integrated in to doctrine. Born 
from an unlikely source, the program had an obvious appeal for commanders on the 
ground. Leaders in the field had a flow of funds they could use to help the local populace, 
gain trust with them, and hopefully shape the outcome of the conflict. With little 
oversight, and the dreaded red tape associated with nearly every other source of funding, 
commanders were free to do as they please, within the rules of the program, to sway the 
people in their favor. There would be no way that the adversary could compete with the 
deep pockets of the local American commander. Generals requested the continuation of 
the program and Congress was happy to oblige. CERP provided an excellent opportunity 
for quick, low-cost, public relations successes. Groundbreakings and ribbon cuttings for 
CERP projects were covered by Combat Camera and provided tangible results for 
military leaders and policy makers. Large sums of money were allocated to CERP and 
doctrine fell in line. 
CERP began in early 2003 as United States ground forces worked their way 
through Iraq looking for high-ranking individuals loyal to Saddam Hussein. Working off 
leads from intelligence sources, Iraqi leaders were found and so were large sums of 
money. The 3rd Infantry Division was successful in securing $1.2 billion in U.S. currency 
found in hiding places owned by former Ba’athist and Republican Guard leaders.23 
Ground forces continued to find money throughout Iraq so the U.S. Central Command 
(CENTCOM) was forced to make a decision about what to do with the money. This 
money was obviously not the possession of the United States but rather pilfered by the 
                                                 
23 Army Lessons Learned, Commander’s Emergency Response Program, 1. 
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Saddam regime from the citizens of Iraq. The United States Army V Corps was quick to 
issue orders giving the money to ground forces for, “humanitarian assistance under the 
name Brigade Commander’s Discretionary Recovery Program to Directly Benefit the 
Iraqi People.”24 Lieutenant Colonel Mark Martins describes the positive results 
experienced in Iraq: “Thousands in Baghdad received a daily wage to clean streets, 
alleys, buildings, and public spaces, far exceeding what U.S. forces alone could do. Iraqis 
repaired and installed hundreds of small generators in municipal buildings—many 
confiscated from abandoned Ba’athist buildings and villas—enabling communities to 
resume basic functions despite slow progress on the electrical grid.”25 By November 
2003, however, the $1.2 billion had run out and Congress would get involved in 
legislation that would continue to fund the program. 
B. LEGISLATURE CREATING AND SUSTAINING THE CERP 
On November 6, 2003, Congress passed House Resolution 3289, Emergency 
Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and 
Afghanistan, 2004. In it, $180 million was allocated for CERP with the explicit 
instructions that the funds be used “for the purpose of enabling military commanders in 
Iraq to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements within their 
areas of responsibility by carrying out programs that will immediately assist the Iraqi 
people, and to establish and fund a similar program to assist the people of Afghanistan.”26 
The loan caveat attached to the funding of CERP was that, “the Secretary of Defense 
shall provide quarterly reports, beginning on January 15, 2004, to the congressional 
defense committees regarding the source of funds and the allocation and use of funds 
made available.”27  
                                                 
24 Army Lessons Learned, Commander’s Emergency Response Program, 1. 
25 Mark S. Martins, “The Commander’s Emergency Response Program,” Joint Force Quarterly Issue 
37, 2nd Quarter (2005): 48. 
26 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and 
Afghanistan, Pub. L. No. 108–106, § 1110, 117 Stat. 1209, 1215 (2003). 
27 Ibid. 
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Appropriated money was distributed as operations and maintenance (O&M) funds 
because, as LTC Martins writes, “commanders were familiar with its use, accountability, 
and management” and the use of O&M funds “was essential to keeping CERP flexible, 
responsive, and unencumbered by procedures associated with procurement, payment of 
claims, or other actions that involve the expenditure of appropriated funds.”28 Perhaps 
most important, using O&M funds allowed CERP to stimulate the local economy by 
using local labor being paid in local currency and thus avoided the bureaucracy and red 
tape found in spending programs that must run through Washington, DC.  
Of the $180 million appropriated for CERP in fiscal year (FY) 2004, $40 million 
was appropriated for use in Afghanistan with $35 million disbursed. The disparate 
amount given to Afghanistan is indicative of the commitment and troop levels 
experienced in the country. At the time of funding, there were 15,800 U.S. troops in 
Afghanistan compared to 134,000 in Iraq. The size and scope of CERP was to increase in 
the years following FY 2004 as ground commanders realized the benefit of the funds.  
For FY 2005, the amount of money dedicated to CERP increased to $854 
million.29 Only $136 million was allocated to forces in Afghanistan where troop levels 
had increased only slightly to 17,500. Conversely, troop levels in Iraq were increased by 
14,000 to 148,000. In Iraq, casualties began to increase as improvised explosive devices 
became more sophisticated.30 Commanders and congressmen felt that CERP funds would 
be an ideal source of income for Iraqi citizens who would otherwise be employed by 
elements aligned against the coalition. In Afghanistan, International Security Assistance 
Forces (ISAF) were still getting a foothold in the country. While U.S. troops were 
successful in disbursing nearly the entire $136 million given to them for CERP, large 
U.S. bases were still being conceived. For Herat, Afghanistan, they would not see a major 
                                                 
28 Martins, “The Commander’s Emergency Response,” 50. 
29 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami 
Relief § 1006, 119 Stat. at 243; Ronald W Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2005 § 1201, 118 Stat. at 2077; Department of Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2005 § 907, 118 
Stat. at 1007. 
30 “Terrorists retool carnage in Iraq,” Washington Times, June 12, 2005, 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2005/jun/12/20050612-123836-8551r/. 
 12
U.S. presence for some time. Iraq would remain the focus point for much of the CERP 
funding for the next couple years as casualties there began to mount.  
In FY 2006, some adjustments were made to legislation regarding CERP. The 
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2006 authorized $500 
million to be used in FY 2006 and another $500 million in FY 2007. For each of the 
fiscal years, Iraq would again take priority over Afghanistan. Approximately $210 
million of the total allocated $500 million for each year would be doled out to efforts in 
Afghanistan. In 2006 and 2007, the United States was facing heavy casualties in Iraq with 
eight times more fatalities than in Afghanistan. In the United States, the public had 
become quite concerned about the situation in Iraq; however, President George W. Bush 
was determined to solve the situation with an increase in troops. A shift in focus to 
Afghanistan would not occur until 2009. Of note, the Act required that the Secretary of 
Defense create official instructions on the use of CERP. The Act states, “Not later than 
30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit 
to the congressional defense committees a copy of the guidance issued by the Secretary to 
the Armed Forces concerning the allocation of funds through the Commanders’ 
Emergency Response Program and any similar program to assist the people of 
Afghanistan.”31 The NDAA for fiscal year 2006 was enacted on January 6, 2006 and the 
Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) was quickly able to provide Department of 
Defense (DOD) Financial Management Regulation 7000.14-R which fulfilled the 
reporting requirements set forth by the act.32 The defense committees were now informed 
of the DOD guidance used to administer CERP; the program would continue for the 
foreseeable future.  
In Afghanistan, the author would experience the tail end of funding for FY 2008 
but would feel the full effect of funding for FY 2009. Like Congress had done in 2006, 
CERP was funded for two fiscal years and it was funded for both Iraq and Afghanistan. 
                                                 
31 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. No. 109–163, § 1202, 119 Stat. 
3136, 3455 (2006). 
32 Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Department of Defense Financial Management 
Regulation, Volume 12, Chapter 27 (April, 2005). 
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Both fiscal years saw dramatic increases in funding; FY 2008 saw $1.7 billion and $1.5 
billion for FY 2009.33 CERP funding had increased nearly ten times from its first version 
in 2004. Iraq remained the focus for allocation but the pendulum was beginning to shift 
over to Afghanistan. Troop levels in Iraq were decreasing after the surge there and troop 
levels were increasing in Afghanistan during this period. It would appear that Congress 
was also becoming a bit concerned about the CERP in Iraq. A number of caveats were 
put in place that required reporting by the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF). The Pentagon 
now had to report project descriptions, justifications, completion dates, sustainment, and 
involvement of the Government of Iraq.34 Congress, it would appear, was looking closely 
at closing out the program in Iraq with an eye on withdrawing U.S. troops. Meanwhile, 
$408 million would be spent in FY 2008 and $500 million would be disbursed to the 
Afghan population in FY 2009.35 The amount of money appropriated to CERP in 
Afghanistan was about to increase dramatically in FY 2010. 
Fiscal year 2010 signaled the last major push for CERP in Afghanistan; funding 
from Congress would decrease from this point forward. For FY2010, $1 billion was 
appropriated for CERP in Afghanistan (and only $300 million for Iraq) under a new one-
year extension and expansion of the Commander’s Emergency Response Program.36 As 
part of the expansion, Congress introduced a stipulation that CERP funds, not to exceed 
$50 million, could be shared with the State Department. The 2010 NDAA reads, “If the 
Secretary of Defense determines that the use of Commanders’ Emergency Response 
Program funds to support the Afghanistan National Solidarity Program would enhance 
counterinsurgency operations or stability operations in Afghanistan, the Secretary of 
Defense may transfer funds, from amounts available for the Commanders’ Emergency 
                                                 
33 Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, Pub. L. No. 110-417, § 
1214, 122 Stat. 4356, 4630 (2008). 
34 Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 § 1214(c), 122 Stat. at 
4630. 
35 Special Inspector General, SIGAR Special Project 15–49, 6. 
36 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–84, § 1222, 123 Stat. at 
2518. 
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Response Program for fiscal year 2010, to the Secretary of State.”37 According to the 
Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, it would appear 
that the $50 million was forwarded on to the Afghanistan National Solidarity Program.38 
Congress was obviously getting concerned with the administration of CERP by the 
Department of Defense and was interested in seeing what the State Department could do 
with the funds. Further highlighting Congress’ concerns about the execution of the 
program, it stipulated, “Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, 
the Secretary of Defense shall conduct a thorough review of the Commander’s 
Emergency Response Program and submit to the congressional defense committees the 
results of such review.”39 Surprisingly, the Department of Defense was not even close to 
disbursing the full $1 billion appropriated to Afghanistan in FY 2010. CERP managers in 
Afghanistan were only able to distribute one-third of the funds, or $328 million. It would 
turn out that 2010 would be the deadliest year in Afghanistan for United States 
servicemen and women. With 499 fatalities, Congress understandably wanted to see a 
return on the investment; if the people of Afghanistan were unwilling or unable to return 
the goodwill provided by CERP, Congress would have to pull the plug on the program. 
Appropriated funds for CERP would quickly decline in the years following 2010.  
C. CERP DOCTRINE 
In 2008, there was no training for individual augmentees who would go on to 
become CERP managers in western Afghanistan. Individuals responsible for CERP 
would have to learn through on-the-job training. Overall, guidance on the execution of 
CERP has been minimal. The first document providing guidance was a memo from the 
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) dated November 25, 2003; the 
                                                 
37 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–84, § 1222, 123 Stat. at 
2518. 
38 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, SIGAR Audit 11–08: Economic and 
Social Development/NSP: Afghanistan’s National Solidarity Program Has Reached Thousands of Afghan 
Communities, but Faces Challenges that Could Limit Outcomes (Washington, DC: SIGAR, March 22, 
2011), 5. 
39 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–84, § 1222, 123 Stat. at 
2519. 
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Comptroller would go on to revise the memorandum in 2005 and 2007.40 At only six 
pages in length, the memo briefly discussed responsibilities, execution procedures, 
reports, and notification requirements. The Comptroller was the obvious choice to 
supervise the CERP because of the large amounts of money that would be handled as part 
of the program. With the Comptroller’s memo short on specific guidance for tactical 
units, The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) created a handbook for 
commanders in the field.  
Released in March 2008, CALL created the most comprehensive guidance for the 
administration of CERP at the tactical level. Although classified as tactics, techniques, 
and procedures (TTP), rather than doctrine, it is a thorough document and would have 
been a great help had it been made available in 2008 to the CERP manager in Herat, 
Afghanistan. As was the case with the Comptroller memos, the CALL handbook 
delineates what the CERP can and cannot be used for and how projects are approved. It 
diverges from the Comptroller memo in that it provides a step-by-step process by which 
projects move from nomination to closure (Figure 1). The clearly stated procedures are 
geared toward the tactical-level decision maker and are supported by examples of forms 
and documents required by higher headquarters for projects to be completed. 
Released in August 2016, the most recent iteration of Joint Publication 3–07 
Stability (JP 3–07), briefly mentions the Commander’s Emergency Response Program. It 
recommends that the Joint Force Commander, “should coordinate early to request 
flexible and immediate funding for work initiatives similar to the Commanders’ 
Emergency Response Program (CERP) utilized in Afghanistan and Iraq to quickly 
implement post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction programs.”41 JP 3–07 is smart in 
pointing out that when utilizing a program like CERP, commanders should make 
informed decisions about how to spend the money. Although time consuming and 
somewhat difficult to gauge, JP 3–07 states that commanders, “must ensure that 
                                                 
40 Comptroller, Memorandum: Commanders’ Emergency Response (2007). 
41 Director for Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5), “Joint Publication 3–07: Stability,” Joint Staff, 
Washington, DC (August 3, 2016), III-34-35. 
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maximum goodwill is created. Commanders must verify that the extra cash does not 
create harmful effects in the local economy. One such side effect would be creating 
unsustainable wages that divert skilled labor from a host nation program essential to its 
legitimacy. Commanders must also ensure that projects can be responsibly administered 
to achieve the desired objective and that they avoid inadvertently financing insurgents.”42 
In Herat, Afghanistan, the CERP manager did not fully understand the ramifications of 
some projects. As mentioned in the example in Chapter I, the bulk purchase of wheat 
seed by the CERP manager was not understood from a fiscal standpoint. The large 
purchase created a harmful effect on the local economy by creating a scarce resource and 
driving up prices. Also of note in JP 3–07 is its mention of transitioning away from 
CERP as the conflict transitions from stabilization efforts to enabling civil authority. 
Commonly referred to as the transition from Phase IV to Phase V, the JP 3–07 notes that 
ongoing projects should be completed during the transition.43 This is clearly the case for 
Afghanistan as evidenced by the decrease in funding for CERP since 2010. 
                                                 
42 Ibid., E-10. 
43 Ibid., E-12. 
 17
 













                                                 
44 Source: Army Lessons Learned, Commander’s Emergency Response Program, 15. 
Project Identif ication 
PPO prepares 
project proposal 
Legal rev iew (if  
required) * 
PPO selects best bid based 
on unit criteria 
PPO contracts f or services 
with v endor 
PA draws f unds f rom 
Finance Of f ice 
PPO and PA prov ide 
progress pay ments to 
contractor IAW 
established schedule 
Unit representativ es & 
PPO inspect project 
upon completion 
PPO & PA prepare 
f inal pay ment 
PA clears project f ile at 







































  Yes  
Does unit












Contract awarded by  a warranted 
contracting of f icer 
PPO 
solicits bids 
Unit conducts project 
hand-of f  with local 
authorities * Funding approv al authorities, legal rev iew thresholds, and war ranted contracting requirements v ary  
by  theater and command 
Project nomination memo
Purchase request & commitment Scope of  
work (SOW) 
Estimated cost Proposed 
timeline 
 18
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 19
III. HOW PROJECTS WERE SELECTED AND MONITORED: 
THE HERAT CASE STUDY 
A. PROJECT SELECTION IN HERAT, AFGHANISTAN 
In 2008, a number of CERP projects were passed on to the incoming program 
manager in Herat.45 Eager to get to work, the new manager met with the AOR 
commander to assess his needs and make sure they were fulfilled. The colonel’s orders 
were simple: “Spend as much money as you can and don’t get killed.” The outgoing 
manager was a reservist Navy commander who had been involved in humanitarian 
missions in Africa before his tour in Afghanistan; this experience served him well. The 
commander understood the dynamics of assisting the population of a third-world country. 
The incoming manager was a young lieutenant with no experience in humanitarian 
operations; he would be given one week to absorb as much information as he could from 
the outgoing commander. The inherited project list included an electrical grid, numerous 
road projects, various school structures, and irrigation projects. These projects had been 
nominated through various means but they all fit the requirements set forth in guidance. 
In addition to the building projects, the ARSIC-W commander maintained a large 
warehouse filled with clothing items, rice, beans, flour, and tarps to be used for villages 
in need of urgent humanitarian assistance. The total budget for projects was never fully 
disclosed and it was understood that cost should not be factor in the selection of a project, 
only in its approval process. With one week of on-the-job training, the new lieutenant 
began his one-year tour as the CERP manager in western Afghanistan. 
Soon after assuming the position as CERP manager, the phone started ringing and 
guests started to arrive at the base front gate. Word was out that there was a new manager 
in town and previously denied projects could be readdressed. The manager needed filters 
to delineate what was worthy and what was not. Filters were found in three people; the 
first was an Afghan Army lieutenant colonel that the lieutenant was tasked with 
                                                 
45 The author is referred to as the “incoming program manager” and “lieutenant” in this chapter. The 
execution of CERP in Herat province was performed by the author from October 2008 to September 2009.  
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mentoring. The other two people were the lieutenant’s interpreters. They were all local 
nationals and had lived in Herat for years. For the most part, they all were in agreement 
on which projects were better than others. Without a means of determining their 
allegiances, most of their recommendations were taken to the AOR commander for sign-
off. It is safe to say that the interpreters and lieutenant colonel could have been 
benefitting monetarily from the approved projects but the CERP manager did not have 
the resources to pursue their backgrounds. They were all thoroughly recommended by the 
outgoing commander. Without question, however, each project met the requirements set 
forth in CERP guidance. On occasion, though, there could have been some inadvertent 
benefit to U.S. and coalition troops. 
Herat province is roughly the same size as the state of West Virginia. There were 
numerous U.S. combat outposts spread across the province and each was usually 
collocated with Afghan Army or Police units for mentoring purposes. From these 
outposts, the U.S. and Afghan forces would patrol their particular area and ensure that 
enemy forces were not in the vicinity. Patrolling units would often run in to village elders 
that were interested in handouts. Outpost personnel would contact the CERP manager to 
see what could be done to meet the village’s needs. This was a regular process and one 
that made the manager’s job easier. The combat outpost personnel would be in charge of 
checking on the projects as they were being executed. As a shop of only four personnel, 
unable to quickly move to the project site, the CERP manager would use the downrange 
assets as eyes and ears. The remote outpost personnel often made their recommendations 
based on villages that supported them with intelligence or by not allowing Taliban or Al-
Qaeda elements in to their area. This project recommendation and selection skirted the 
edge of rules that stipulated CERP could not be used for the benefit of U.S. or coalition 
forces. As in all cases, each project was carefully scrutinized by the AOR Judge 
Advocate General to ensure that they met all legal requirements set forth in guidance. 
Each situation involving CERP funds eventually met the requirement of humanitarian 
assistance and reconstruction. The downside to all projects, whether downrange or local, 
was having the engineering knowledge to determine if a project was structurally sound. 
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B. PROJECT MONITORING: CHALLENGES FOR MANAGEMENT AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
Monitoring CERP construction projects in Herat province presented some 
problems. Security concerns and low manning levels contributed to the difficulties. When 
the CERP manager arrived in Afghanistan in October 2008, there were 32,400 troops on 
the ground there; meanwhile, in Iraq, there were 151,000. Iraq, clearly, was the focus for 
manpower and resources.  
Problems started with the requirement to have three, fully manned vehicles for all 
movements outside of the base perimeter. The requirement was a legitimate one; combat 
patrols in western Afghanistan were susceptible to roadside bombs, small arms fire, and 
various other forms of attack. The security provided by a large group of vehicles was 
welcomed, however, the manning required was difficult to acquire on a regular basis. 
Each vehicle would require at least four individuals: a driver, a truck commander, a 
gunner manning the crew-served weapon, and a dismount-capable shooter. Additionally, 
one combat medic was required on all movements outside the wire. With only four 
individuals in the CERP shop, an additional nine people were needed to check on 
projects. Nearly every mission would also be joined by a large contingent of Afghan 
Army personnel in order to add to the legitimacy of the projects. Coordination and 
significant effort was required to just get out the gate. It was commonplace for CERP 
personnel to lend their services to the border patrol and police mentors in order for them 
to complete their missions; manpower was scarce and so there was an expectation of 
reciprocity if personnel were loaned to other groups.  
Of greater concern was the lack of engineering experience amongst U.S. forces in 
western Afghanistan. A small cadre from the Army Corps of Engineers had been 
dispatched to Herat but they were involved in major building projects worth millions of 
dollars and had no time available to assist the CERP manager. Quality control for 
construction projects was difficult to judge. It became immediately clear that the 
expectation that structures would be built to U.S. standards was out of the question. 
Quality building materials like concrete, lumber, and hardware were non-existent. Wells 
were often dug by hand or with antiquated techniques. Demanding western-level building 
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materials would drive prices well above the caps set for CERP. Ultimately, the village 
elder for the project site was usually the one that would be the best judge of quality. If he 
was happy with the project, work would proceed and if it was seen to be sub-par, the 
project would be corrected. As the CERP manager became more experienced, he could 
produce more detailed scopes of work and hold contractors accountable. There were, 





















IV. DID PROJECTS ACHIEVE THEIR INTENDED GOAL? 
A. RECALLING THE INTENDED GOAL 
Ongoing security concerns in Afghanistan continue to plague the United States. 
Al-Qaeda is a persistent threat in at least seven different provinces in Afghanistan.46 
Despite enormous amounts of money and bloodshed, the enemy continues to be a threat. 
For someone not familiar with CERP, it would appear to be an enormous waste of money 
and effort. How could the U.S. spend so much money on such an ungrateful populace, 
completely unwilling to take the steps necessary to secure its own security? But was 
CERP created to secure the country? It is the author’s opinion that the role of CERP was 
never to be a security apparatus. As guidance stated from the very beginning, “CERP is 
designed to enable local commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan to respond to urgent 
humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements within their areas of responsibility by 
carrying out programs that will immediately assist the indigenous population.”47 If it was 
meant to further the efforts of the United States military, the Under Secretary of Defense 
(Comptroller) would never have stipulated, “appropriated funds made available for the 
CERP shall not be used for . . . direct or indirect benefit to U.S., coalition, or supporting 
military personnel.”48 According to the Under Secretary, what was created with CERP 
was an extremely large bank account that U.S. commanders could access to help people 
in their AOR. At no point should the ground commander expect anything in return that 
would be construed as a benefit to his forces. However, it would appear that the 
stipulation pronounced by the Under Secretary was largely ignored as Secretary of 
Defense Robert Gates stated in testimony to the U.S. Senate in 2007:  
“Commander’s Emergency Response Program or (CERP) funds are a 
relatively small piece of the war-related budgets…But because they can be 
dispensed quickly and applied directly to local needs, they have had a 
                                                 
46 Bill Roggio and Thomas Jocelyn, “US military is hunting al Qaeda in at least 7 Afghanistan 
provinces,” Long War Journal (September 24, 2016), http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/09/us-
military-is-hunting-al-qaeda-in-at-least-7-afghan-provinces.php. 
47 (Comptroller), Financial Management Regulation, 27–3. 
48 Under Secretary of Defense, Comptroller, Memorandum, 2. 
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tremendous impact–far beyond the dollar value—on the ability of our 
troops to succeed in Iraq and Afghanistan. By building trust and 
confidence in coalition forces, these CERP projects increase the flow of 
intelligence to commanders in the field and help turn local Iraqis and 
Afghans against insurgents and terrorists.”49  
For the purpose of this paper, I have assumed that the commander of U.S. forces 
in western Afghanistan approved projects with the intent that they may assist U.S. forces 
in successfully performing their mission. 
B. HAVE PROJECTS “WORKED”? CONFLICTING STANDARDS 
PRODUCE MIXED MESSAGES 
“Urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction” can be interpreted in a number of 
different ways, but the Under Secretary of Defense helped commanders by delineating in 
his guidance on what could and could not be done with CERP funds. Those project types 
are delineated in Chapter I, but confusion was found in the definition of “reconstruction.” 
The term implies that the U.S. would use CERP to build things that had been previously 
damaged or destroyed. There is no known guidance that provides a timeline for that 
damaged property. Should AOR commanders use their funds to repair a building 
damaged during the first Anglo-Afghan War of the 1840s? Do we rebuild the hotel 
damaged during the Soviet occupation in the 1970s? In 2008 and 2009, there were no 
instances of reconstruction of property damaged prior to U.S. involvement in the AOR. 
The AOR commander in western Afghanistan, however, was prepared to fix property 
damaged by U.S. forces. On a few occasions, payments were made to individuals whose 
property was damaged by U.S. forces. The largest disbursed sum was $2500 for a totaled 
Toyota van, the victim of a collision with a Cougar Mine Resistant Ambush Protected 
truck. Aside from those few instances, however, most projects involved new buildings 
and not reconstruction. 
Reconstruction is better explained if you understand that Afghanistan is a 
primitive place with weak infrastructure; one major paved road, little electricity, and 
rarely running water. Whether stuck in time because of nearly constant conflict or 
                                                 
49 Army Lessons Learned, Commander’s Emergency Response Program, 1. 
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because of rampant corruption or perhaps due to a brain drain, Afghanistan has never 
been able to absorb and build on U.S. assistance. People travel long distances by donkey 
to reach a market, homes are usually made of mud, and life expectancy is 51 years. The 
correct term to use should be “construction” rather than “reconstruction.” U.S. assistance, 
to include CERP, is not reconstructing anything; we are building entirely new 
infrastructure, where none had existed, and thus by process of elimination, providing 
“urgent humanitarian relief.” 
As part of the author’s pass down to his replacement, the author produced a 
spreadsheet that documented 52 projects that were in various stages of completion in late-
summer 2009 (Figure 2). The list provides a glimpse in to the wide range of projects that 
were part of the CERP in Herat province. Structural enhancements or the construction of 
new buildings have been analyzed to determine if they still stand and appear to be 
functioning as intended. Utilizing open source, geospatial intelligence gathered by 
DigitalGlobe's Enhanced View Web Hosting Service, it can be determined with a 
moderate level of certainty that these projects have been successful. Successful projects 
have been annotated in green in Figure 2. Unable to accurately locate projects without a 
reliable military grid reference system (MGRS), those ventures have been listed as 
having unknown results and are shown as yellow in Figure 2. Three projects are clearly 
failures and are annotated as such in the list with colored markings of red.  
Five projects were one-time contracts that did not call for ongoing support or 
maintenance. Canal (or karez) clearances were required following the warm months in 
western Afghanistan. These canals were hand dug and ran from major waterways to 
provide irrigation to area crops; they often became overgrown or filled with silt and 
required upkeep before the winter storms. These canal clearances were generally an 
inexpensive way to employ local nationals, for a short term, while assisting area farmers. 
The list also includes pharmaceuticals that were purchased on the local economy to 
support humanitarian efforts conducted by the Afghan Minister of Health. 
The list concludes that 54% of the projects can be deemed a success while 6% are 
failures. In the sections below, two projects that have been determined to be failures will 
be highlighted followed by two successful projects. Forty percent of the projects that 
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were ongoing in September 2009 have unknown results. Unknown results appear to be in 
keeping with SIGAR and their assertion that, “according to data provided by DOD, the 
largest group of completed CERP projects lacked specific categorization and remain 
unknown.”50 The CENTCOM Command Inspector General highlighted the shortfalls of 
the CERP Reviewing/Reporting Toolset (CRRT); the central reporting database for the 
program: “(SIGAR) lists 6,400 projects as ‘unknown’ category, totaling $.5B. Without 
the source documentation, we are unable to confirm if these are indeed uncategorized, as 
CRRT does not keep records for the entire timeframe.”51 
                                                 
50 Special Inspector General, SIGAR Special Project 15–49, 3. 
51 Ibid., 18. 
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Figure 2.  Herat province CERP Projects, September 2009.52 
                                                 
52 Source: author’s collection, Excel spreadsheet, “ARSIC-W CIMIC PROJECTS,” September 2009. 
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C. FAILED PROJECT—SHINDAND AGRICULTURE RESEARCH 
STATION 
Images show that some projects have fared quite well while others have not. One 
example of the latter is the Shindand Agriculture Research Station. This facility was a 
shining example of new construction, filled with much promise. The southern district of 
Shindand was a troubling place for U.S. forces. With adequate irrigation, the area was 
known for its poppy production. Situated against the eastern border of Iran, it also 
represented an ideal location for the smuggling of arms in to Afghanistan. Shindand was 
of great importance to the Afghan government because it held an airstrip that would later 
become a major facility for Afghanistan’s fledgling air force. Stabilization in Shindand 
was important for the future of Herat Province. In order to move the local population 
away from poppy production, and hopefully away from criminal activity, the Herat 
Province representative for the Afghan Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) requested CERP 
funds be used to build a facility that could train local farmers to cultivate something other 
than poppy. With the full support of the local United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) representative, the AOR commander approved CERP funds for 
the construction of the new facility. 
Completed in May 2008, the facility was purposely built inside the fence line of 
the military base at Shindand. The facility would provide a safe learning environment to 
local farmers, free from the intimidation expected from arms smugglers and opium 
producers. At the request of the MoA representative, the facility was built with fish 
ponds, fruit tree groves, gardens, a bee keeper station, classroom, and living quarters for 
instructors (Figure 3). Subsequent CERP funding was allocated for equipment purchases, 
seed procurement, and the staff was paid by the Minister of Agriculture. 
There appears to be a point where the ability to sustain the project was not 
possible. In September 2009, a sustainment request of $400,000 was requested but never 
fulfilled. The land that the agriculture station occupied was not chosen carefully. 
Unbeknownst to the MoA and the AOR commander, the land had already been 
earmarked for an airbase extension. The fruit tree grove was bulldozed and replaced by a 
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field hospital, the fish ponds were drained, and the other building were reclaimed by the 
Minister of Defense for Shindand base operations (Figure 4).  
Figure 3.  Shindand Agriculture Research Station, August 29, 2008.53 
Figure 4.  Shindand Agriculture Research Station, October 1, 2016.54 
53 Adapted from Shindand–Enhanced View Web Hosting, Digital Globe, last accessed October 21, 
2016, https://evwhs.digitalglobe.com/myDigitalGlobe/#18/33.39139/62.26689. 
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D. FAILED PROJECT—KHAIRABAD SCHOOL REPAIRS 
The small village of Khairabad is located in a remote section of southern Herat 
province. The village is situated approximately five miles from the Shouz Afghanistan 
Police Training facility. In 2008, the training facility was run by a seasoned U.S. Army 
captain that had served multiple combat tours in Afghanistan. The captain had established 
a relationship with the local community and often held shuras, or meetings, with village 
elders to discuss security concerns. He realized that many of the elders tended to defer 
their thoughts and opinions to one man, Faisal Ahmad (Figure 5). Mr. Ahmad was an 
interesting gentleman who had a tenuous relationship with coalition forces. Thought to be 
an arms smuggler moving weapons into Herat from Iran, he was rumored to be on a 
coalition Joint Prioritized Effects List (JPEL). This designation could not be confirmed; 
however, being a JPEL target would have most certainly led to his death or capture. In 
2008 and 2009, he was very much alive and working closely with the Army captain in 
Shouz. According to Faisal Ahmad, he became powerful because of his family. In 
the early 1980s, the U.S. government identified Ahmad’s father as being the lucky 
recipient of a Stinger missile system. Having gained access to the decisive weapon 
in the war against the Soviets, the elder Ahmad became an instant warlord. The 
Ahmad family was set for the foreseeable future.  
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Figure 5.  Faisal Ahmad with the Author in front of the Khairabad School, 
January 2009.55 
Faisal Ahmad approached the author in early 2009 to discuss an issue he had with 
a school that was built by Turkish forces a few years earlier. Located a short distance 
from Ahmad’s property, he stated that the roof had been torn off of the structure by a 
violent wind storm. An assessment was made on the structure and it appeared that indeed 
the roof was gone and that a large number of windows, fixtures, and electrical systems 
had been stolen from the facility. Ahmad assured us that the security of the facility would 
be substantially increased by adding a security wall and that he would take personal 
responsibility for the facility remaining intact should it be completed again. With the U.S. 
Army captain’s confirmation, CERP funds were allocated to making the facility complete 
again with the addition of a security wall and bathroom facilities (Figure 6). The 
completion of the project would take place after the author’s departure from theater. 
                                                 
55 Source: author’s collection. 
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Figure 6.  Khairabad School, September 29, 2013.56 
Analysis of imagery taken in October 2016 reveals that the Khairabad School 
CERP project has been a failure (Figure 7). The roof of the school facility has been 
removed and it is assumed that classes are no longer being conducted in the facility. With 
harsh summers and very cold winters, the ability to conduct classes in a facility without a 
roof would be difficult. It also appears that the wood support beams for the roof have 
been removed and most likely used for alternative purposes. No doors are present at the 
entrance to the facility and no doors are evident at the entrance to each classroom. It is 
unknown if the demise of Faisal Ahmad led to a lack of security oversight and the 
subsequent failure of the Khairabad School. 
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Figure 7.  Khairabad School, October 1, 2016.57 
E. SUCCESSFUL PROJECT–HERAT TEACHER TRAINING CENTER 
ARSIC-W was the main handler of CERP funds in western Afghanistan in 2008. 
During the period between 2008 and 2009, the commander for ARSIC-W received many 
requests for CERP fuds to be allocated to the building of new schools. The issue with 
schools in Herat Province was that qualified teachers were difficult to find. In order to 
remedy this situation, a Teacher Training Center (TTC) was established. As is still the 
case, security concerns were prevalent throughout the country. The Herat Minister of 
Education and the Dean of the Herat Teacher Training Center approached the ARSIC-W 
commander about building a security wall and guard tower at the entrance to the Training 
Center grounds. Avenues of approach to the Training Center were clear and straight and 
were assessed to be ideal for vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (Figure 8). 
Women were being trained at the facility and hardline, former Taliban members had 
voiced their displeasure at the reintegration of women in to Afghan society. 
Compounding the security concerns was the fact that many of the women attending the 
center had school age children. The center offered schooling for these children while their 
mothers studied so all parties involved wanted a safe learning environment.  
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The ARSIC-W commander quickly approved the use of CERP funds to finance a 
900-meter perimeter wall, guard station, and entry control point for vehicles and 
pedestrians. Work began in the fall of 2008 and was completed in February 2009. Wisely, 
the Dean of the Training Center requested a wall that was substantially larger than the 
existing facilities. Expansion of the Herat Teacher Training Facility would occur again in 
2012 using CERP funds. Two, two-story, twenty-classroom buildings were constructed at 
a cost just under $1 million and the original 900-meter perimeter wall completed in 2009 
would continue to protect the students and faculty attending the Center (Figure 9). 
 





                                                 




Figure 9.  Herat Teacher Training Center, September 29, 2016.59 
F. SUCCESSFUL PROJECT–ZENDA JAN NESWAN SCHOOL 
Zenda Jan is a village on the road between the city of Herat and the Iranian 
border. Additionally, the village is situated along the banks of the Hari River. Zenda Jan 
benefits from the abundant trade travelling to and from Herat and Iran; the river provides 
the resources to grow a large variety of crops. In 2008, Zenda Jan was expanding at a 
rapid rate. People originally from Herat, who had fled to Iran during the Taliban regime, 
were returning in great numbers and they were settling in Zenda Jan. The ARSIC-W 
commander was fond of Zenda Jan because it was peaceful and quickly becoming a 
shining example of potential and success in an otherwise challenged province.   
In mid-2008, the ARSIC-W commander was approached by the Herat Minister of 
Education and introduced to the idea of funding a school complex in Zenda Jan. The 
Minister pledged to provide properly trained teachers and administers while the sub-
governor of Zenda Jan district pledged his commitment to providing a safe learning 
environment. Further enticing the commander was the commitment to provide education 
to boy and girls, something not seen with the Taliban government. The ARSIC-W 
commander was quick to pledge his support for the project and the CERP process was 
                                                 
59 Adapted from Herat–Enhanced View Web Hosting. 
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underway. Property was allocated by the Zenda Jan district governor and construction 
began in the summer of 2009 (Figure 10). 
 
Figure 10.  Zenda Jan School Site, April 6, 2009.60 
As the author was departing Afghanistan, the Zenda Jan school was in its final 
stages of construction. One school building was constructed for boy and one building was 
constructed for girls. In between the two buildings were a large recreation area and a 
small area for a garden. Vocational training for farmers could be conducted at the facility 
utilizing the garden. A guard house and security wall was constructed to protect all 
occupants. Restroom facilities were part of the contract, as was a small building for staff. 
Recent overhead imagery shows that the school has been a success and it appears to be 
operating as intended (Figure 11). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The Commander’s Emergency Response Program was designed to assist military 
leaders engaged in stability operations. Easily accessible funds were made available to 
assist the people of Afghanistan. When determining if the CERP was successful, any 
finding must assume that the program benefited the Afghan people. American dollars 
were paid to Afghan contractors to build structures in Afghanistan. These structures and 
services were almost always new and not rehabilitation efforts or repairs. Goods and 
services were paid for by the United States and they were given, free of charge, to the 
people of Afghanistan; these facts are undeniable. Problems arise when the United States 
determines accountability and finds that many of the projects are unaccounted for or in an 
unknown status. The program, however, was not designed to produce structures that were 
to have a particular lifespan. In Herat province, there was no contract written that stated a 
school or clinic had to be built to withstand 10 years of use. Thousands of fruit trees were 
purchased but they were not required to produce fruit for 5 years. Sustainability, 
however, was always a concern when spending CERP money. Schools were built only if 
the Afghan government could ensure teachers would be available to teach. Clinics were 
built only if doctors and medicine were available. A reasonable amount of prediction was 
needed to determine if CERP projects could survive after the withdrawal of U.S. forces 
from Afghanistan. 
While short-term gain to the people of Afghanistan is apparent, the long-term 
results are to be determined. The security situation in the country remains volatile and the 
strength of the government continues to be questionable. Without a government willing 
or able to maintain the facilities built using CERP funds, the program could become a 
failure of enormous proportions. In the future, CERP may be deemed a failure if the 
Afghan government fails and the Taliban regain control of the country but analysts will 
need to recall that the program was never intended to benefit U.S. or coalition forces. The 
program was not designed to keep the Afghan government in power and it was never 
intended to promote anything put in place by outside entities. The fact remains, the 
Commander’s Emergency Response Program was designed to provide urgent 
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humanitarian assistance to Afghans. Needs were addressed in the near term using large 
sums of money; perhaps the long-term results are irrelevant. 
Future stability operations would benefit from a program like CERP. Giving 
ground force commanders a tool to help the local community is important. Readily 
accessible funds, with minimal strings attached, managed by a capable officer can benefit 
a host nation ravaged by war. Future programs, however, must be managed by 
individuals properly trained to run the program. Pre-deployment training should include 
rudimentary lessons on construction techniques used in the host country. CERP managers 
would benefit from having instruction in contracting, procurement, and the legal aspects 
of the program. A strong CERP manager should also be familiar with the decision makers 
in the AOR such as host nation government officials, U.S. government representatives, 
and leaders in non-governmental organizations. Establishing personal relationships early 
would preclude any duplication of efforts. Also important is the establishment of a 
measure of effectiveness. Understanding what a well-run program looks like will help 
keep all projects on track and on budget. Lastly, future CERP must have a computer-
based system that tracks all projects from start to finish. Much of the criticism of the 
Afghan CERP program has focused on a lack of accountability. Many of the projects 
categorized as unknown could have easily been tracked and accounted for using a simple 
theater-wide computer system. Unfortunately, in Afghanistan, that program was lacking 
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